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Abstract This article aims at making a case for the role of seduction in existential
education, that is, education that focuses on the pupil’s life choices. First, the article
attempts to show that the relationship between the teacher and the pupil can be understood
as a form of seduction. Secondly, the article examines how such a relationship functions in
practice. Thirdly, the article warns against dangerous aspects related to seduction, and
lastly, the article offers five conditions for how seduction can be used in a justifiable
manner in existential education.
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With regard to existential issues about attitudes to life, freedom, responsibility, meaning,
choice, and values, how can the teacher meet the pupils? How should the teacher meet the
pupils who, for example, has created a connection and understanding for their own way of
living through engaging meeting with certain macho ideals from Hollywood movies? In
such a situation it would be clearly tactless for the teacher to suggest that the pupils bases
their life upon an illusion and that they ought to choose another direction in life. Inevitably
this would perhaps be understood as a provocation and the pupils would most likely put up
a strong defence. This consequently would result in two opposing attitudes creating a
distance between the pupils and the teacher. The teacher’s direct thrust may even have
strengthened the pupils’ present attitude.1
In a Kierkegaardian perspective a seductive thrust can succeed to a greater degree when
one acknowledges that there is always an uncertainty connected to the education of another
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person. Kierkegaard underlines that one can never force upon another a meaning, per-
suasion or belief (Kierkegaard 1859/1998, p. 50). It is always the other person who must
take the final leap into a new attitude to life. The teacher must not reprimand the pupils but
take them seriously, be an attentive listener and slowly but surely add something that
enriches the pupils present form for existence. This is the kind of seduction where the
teacher can ensnare the pupils, making them aware of and perhaps interested in another
perspective which challenges their present attitude to life. This seduction therefore has
consequently a slight connection to education as it can lead the pupils into an educational
process that questions their present attitude.
Nevertheless, we must not forget the following: As soon as one introduces seduction
into pedagogy, problems emerge. In order to clarify some of the central problems I will, in
this essay, turn to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s pedagogic starting point was as follows. He
maintained that the Christians in his lifetime were seduced and therefore had persuaded
themselves that they were Christians, when in reality they were not (Kierkegaard 1859/
1998, p. 47). A central pedagogic question for Kierkegaard was how it is possible to get the
seduced Christians out of their misunderstanding and at the same time get them to realise
the necessity of higher life forms, the ethical and religious forms for existence. One answer
was to capture these people so that they are given an opportunity to release themselves
from their point of view and so choose another way of living. This can be achieved through
what Kierkegaard called ‘‘aesthetic portrayal,’’ which involves seduction (ibid., p. 51).
This is how Kierkegaard saw an opportunity to reach those people who had convinced
themselves that they were Christians, while in reality they lived as ‘‘aesthetes,’’ concerned
with immediate sensations and pleasure.
An important point with reference to the pedagogic art of seduction, is that Kierkegaard
had to begin where they were; namely, in the aesthetic life form in order to reach out to
them and further to challenge them to choose another direction in life. Nonetheless, in this
essay I will not discuss how people who imagine they are Christians can convert to ‘real’
Christianity. I will, in other words, not limit myself to Kierkegaard’s religious-existential
project, but I shall construct a pedagogic proposal that looks at the whole in a greater
existentialist perspective, where the Christian existential form can be seen as one of many
forms for existence.
My main question is what the role of seduction in existential education is. I will address
this question in four steps. Since seduction is a dangerous measure I will first ask what the
dangers of seduction are. I will then explore what seduction’s potential for existential
education is. In the book The point of view for my work as an author (1859), which was
first published after Kierkegaard’s death, we find yet another problem connected to
seduction’s role in existential education which has to do with the fact that the aim of
seduction and deception is to bring about demystification. A ‘‘demystifier,’’ according to
Biesta (1998), is someone who believes he can remove other people’s delusions. The
problem here is that the demystifier assumes that other people live in an imaginary world
while he himself possesses the truth. Therefore I ask, in the final step, what kind of
seduction can be used in existential education.
In addressing these questions I shall, firstly, attempt to show that the relationship
between the teacher and the pupil is a form of seduction. Secondly, I shall attempt to show
how such a relationship functions in practice. Thirdly, I shall warn against dangerous
aspects related to seduction, and lastly, I shall give some ‘rules’ or conditions for how
seduction can be used in a justifiable manner in existential education.
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Existential Education
In the book Fear and trembling (1843) Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes de Silentio
dismantles Hegel’s concept of education (in German: Bildung) as he believes that this
concept brings about conventional and bourgeois individuals. The reason is, according to
Kierkegaard, that the individual must put himself aside in order to advance culture. As an
alternative to the idea of education as cultivation, de Silentio introduces an existentialist
view of education.
What, then, is education? I believed [sic] it is the course the individual goes through
in order to catch up with himself [at indhente sig selv], and the person who will not
go through this course is not much helped by being born in the most enlightened age.
(Kierkegaard 1843/1983, p. 46; my emphasis)
This indicates that one will not be oneself by incorporating cultural values and norms as
Hegel maintains. Rather, one must be involved with what Kierkegaard calls ‘‘catching up
with oneself.’’ This means searching back to how one was before culture began to influence
one’s life. Kierkegaard wants the individual to take a critical distance to the culture, so that
the process of individualisation can take place, more or less, without cultivation or soci-
alisation. As the individual goes into this process, he may be himself anew. The core for
this form of existential education, seen from the teacher’s perspective, is to cultivate the
individual’s specificities, its singularity and uniqueness, which Kierkegaard in 1854
described as ‘distinctiveness’ (in Danish: Eiendommelighed; see Garff 2008a, p. 132).
According to Kierkegaard our distinctiveness has been given to each of us by God (ibid.,
p. 129). Kierkegaard’s God is not a friend of the bourgeois or of conventionalism, but has a
weakness for the marginal, those who do not immediately fit into certain cultural circles
(ibid., p. 117).
Against this background it is possible to interpret Kierkegaard as believing that each
person is already unique because God is the one who gave everyone his or her unique
characteristics. Such an interpretation implies a form of existential education which is
about cultivating unique characteristics that are already in the individual. Although this
may be true, one can also read Kierkegaard’s text in another manner. In fact, Fear and
trembling shows that people can catch up with themselves, that is to say that they can
become redeemed and saved from their current existence, through an outer force. As when
Abraham was about to offer his son Isaac, God stepped in and stopped the sacrifice. This
example makes it possible to say that Kierkegaard’s pseudonym de Silentio rejects every
question about what people are. This is supported by Westphal (2008, p. 25), who says that
Kierkegaard, like Levinas, contradicts Socrates’ idea that the learner already has the truth
within. Furthermore, an absolute inestimable power, God, called Abraham who answered,
and in the moment Abraham accepted the call, he had been singled out (see Davenport
2008). In other words, it is God who singles us out, or, individualises us (see Caputo 2008,
p. 19).
Of course this form of education, which can be derived from Kierkegaard’s texts, is very
specific. Nevertheless, we can see a certain relationship to a more modern form of peda-
gogy. In that context I think of Biesta’s (2009) three functions of education which, as he
argues, can also be understood as three possible domains of educational purpose. One
function of education has to do with qualification, in which the individual shall be qualified
for something specific. It can, for example, be about qualifying the individual for a pro-
fession. Another function has to do with socialisation, where the purpose is to insert each
individual into existing social, cultural, political and other orders. Neither of these two
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functions can be related to Kierkegaard’s notion of education. He is neither interested in
qualifying or socialisation. In fact, he argues that individualisation must take place outside
any form of socialisation or cultivation. This means that we can place Kierkegaard’s
existential education in the function Biesta (2009) describes as the subjectification func-
tion/domain. Biesta (2009, p. 356) says that this function can best be understood as the
opposite of the socialisation function of education. The reason is that the individual should
not be part of an already existing order, but should rather become independent from such
orders. It would be wrong to talk about an objective truth when it comes to the individ-
uation or subjectification of people. Rather, it is a matter of subjective truth. The difference
between these two forms of truth is as follows. On the one hand, we can imagine the person
to qualify as a doctor. It is essential that a doctor knows the objective truth about the human
anatomy for instance. Therefore, a medical study, similar to other studies, must contain a
great deal of qualification, where medical students must strive to get the objective content
right. When it comes to existence and how to live life, however, one must think differently.
One can not tell the person that s/he must live in a certain way. Of course one can point out
some ways for the person, but, and this is the salient point for Kierkegaard (1846/1992), the
individual must choose on his or her own. As soon as the existential choice is made, the
individual must appropriate the truth, inscribe it in his or her life (see Caputo 2008, p. 64).
This is no universally valid truth, but rather an existential truth, or, as Caputo (2008, p. 61)
refers to as ‘‘the truth that is true for me.’’
In this way a range of pedagogic challenges occur, for example: How can one make an
individual a new attitude to life? How is it possible for a teacher to both remain intentional,
and yet engineer a free choice? As I have already argued, one apparently won’t get very far
by speaking convincingly to the intellect about the excellence of one way of existing. What
then? Should the teacher simply give up? Yes, either that or one can appeal to something
that lies ‘deeper’ in the pupil than the rational consciousness. This can be done via
existential seduction, because it is a non-rational and unpredictable communication form
that can lead us away from ourselves almost without us noticing it, and over into a path we
perhaps in the beginning have no desire to take. Of course one is taking a risk planting
seeds in the pupils unconscious that are in direct opposition to the pupils conscious wishes.
One is in danger of leading the pupils astray. It is precisely here that the ethical boundary
becomes relevant, something we must not close our eyes to. Nevertheless, seduction can be
pedagogically valuable, and this has, in part, to do with that it has a magical power that we
do not understand—a power with the ability to bring about a fascination for something.2 I
see now that an explanation is needed in regards to what is meant by Kierkegaard’s notion
of seduction, notably from a particular point of view.
2 I am fully aware that the notion of existential education, as I am about to define it, is reminiscent of liberal
education, as for example Arcilla defines the latter notion in his book For the love of perfection: Richard
Rorty and liberal education. Let me thus clarify that there are certain differences between the two notions of
education. In the mentioned book Arcilla discusses liberal education in the context of Richard Rorty’s
educational philosophy. To avoid and disarm the antagonism and hypocrisy of culture he forms a specific
notion of education; viz., conversational edification (Arcilla 1995, p. 105). The difference between Arcilla’s
views on liberal education and the notion of existential pedagogy that I highlight is shown where he, as I see
it, abandons Rorty’s concept of irony. That he does, I take it, where he seeks to connect the conversational
education to a kind of moral perfectionism (ibid., p. 132; see also Biesta 1997, p. 87). In my view, Arcilla’s
faith in the good and perfect becomes too certain, so that a teacher, for example, can easily point out the
direction in which the pupil should go. The existential education, on the other hand, is more about chal-
lenging—for example through seduction—pupils’ position in life, rather than guiding them to another
position in life.
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Seduction: Eroticism, Spirituality, and Deception
In the book Either/Or (1843) it is stated that in the main there are two ways to seduce. One
is the immediate/erotic seduction, and the other is the spiritual/intellectual seduction.
Eroticism
In The immediate erotic stages, included in Either/Or, Don Giovanni is characterised as an
immediate seducer who seduces through the erotic. He is like music that disappears just as
fast as it is played. The power of the word is totally foreign to him. The only thing he cares
about is to seduce in a spontaneous manner. He always moves from one woman to another
and ends up having seduced 1,003 women (a number that indicates that he continues to
seduce). Apart from this one must be very careful calling Don Giovanni a seducer, says A
(Kierkegaard’s pseudonym in this text). But Don Giovanni is only in a certain way and to a
certain extent a seducer.
He enjoys the satisfaction of desire; as soon as he has enjoyed it, he seeks a new
object, and so it goes on indefinitely. Thus he does indeed deceive, but still not in
such a way that he plans his deception in advance; it is the power of the sensuous
itself that deceives the seduced, and it is rather a kind of nemesis. (Kierkegaard 1843/
1987, p. 99)
The actions of Don Giovanni are characteristic of a deceiver rather than a seducer, but—
and this is the salient point—his deception is vulgar because he lacks both sly preparation
and thorough planning.
Spirituality
Faust is a different seducer than Don Giovanni. He can be said to be an intellectual
seducer. In contrast to Don Giovanni, Faust is unmusical. His weapon is first and foremost
the word, which is also the chief weapon of Johannes, the main character in The seducer’s
diary (which is incorporated in Either/Or). More correctly, Johannes combines both
forms of seduction—even though he characterises himself as an ‘‘aesthete, an eroticist’’
(Kierkegaard 1843/1987, p. 368). It is this combination which makes him particularly
powerful and dangerous. This is evident in the last phase of his seduction of Cordelia. In
the heat of the duel the young woman attempts to seduce Johannes with erotic means only
(ibid., p. 411). She has only one weapon at her disposal. Johannes, on the other hand, has
two weapons, the erotic and the spiritual. ‘‘Sometimes one must place oneself very high,
yet in such a way that there remains a place still higher; sometimes one must place oneself
very low.’’ (ibid., p. 400). Johannes knows when he shall place himself on a higher and
spiritual plane and when he shall put himself on an erotic and lower plane. But first and
foremost he bides his time. He doesn’t sprint like Don Giovanni. On the contrary, he plans
his actions so that he can be one step ahead of his victim and, also to be able to ‘‘gaze into
her future’’ (ibid., p. 355). The seducer par excellence combines the erotic with the
spiritual. That is to say that the seduction is both immediate and—first and foremost—
prolonged (see Garff 2008b), as both planning and the use of tricks are an important part
of the seduction.
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Deception
Deception is also used in seduction. Johannes admits that he likes to
keep the listeners to my story in suspenso by means of minor actions of an episodic
nature to ascertain how they want it to turn out, and then in the course of the telling
to fool them. My art is to use amphibolies so that the listeners understand one thing
from what is said and then suddenly perceive that the words can be interpreted
another way. (Kierkegaard 1843/1987, p. 370)
It is difficult to separate deception from seduction, because they merge with one
another. Nonetheless it is possible to make a distinction between them. As seducer,
Johannes meets the audience face to face, which is necessary when the aim is to capture the
attention and empathy of others. Through ‘‘minor actions of an episodic nature’’ an erotic
energy is created, whereupon the listeners are ensnared by Johannes’s trap. In such a
manner they are disarmed, they are in his grasp and can now listen in anticipation. At the
same time he deceives them. This happens as he starts to create confidence. He gives the
audience the impression that he will explain the rumour that he has consciously spread
about. In this manner the audience and Johannes appear to follow the same rule. But as
soon as trust is established the deceiver changes the rule without the audience being aware
of it. He goes behind their backs, as his deeply held secret intention is to create a false
impression. Here we find perhaps the greatest difference between seduction and deception.
As a seducer, Johannes meets his opponent face to face—such that a relationship occurs
between them. As a deceiver, on the contrary, he goes as it were behind his opponent’s
back. There he can go unnoticed—provided the seduction has been successful. In other
words: if he has managed to catch the audience’s attention they will most likely not notice
what is going on behind their backs.
In Either/Or Kierkegaard thus shows that seduction can combine the immediate and the
erotic with intellectual processes, and also with deception. Before I turn to the question
how seduction can be employed in existential education I will discuss some of the dangers
of seduction.
The Dangers of Seduction and Its Potential for Existential Education
The seducer’s diary shows us a person who, as a seducer, goes too far. This text thus sets a
clear boundary for seduction. Johannes takes no notice of this boundary. He divorces
himself from so called ‘‘vulgar seducers,’’ for example a judge who gives sinners false
promises of freedom if they confess (Kierkegaard 1843/1987, p. 367). Such a person uses
only his power and his talent, instead of finding out where the other stands, and so begin
there. Johannes does just this. He does not begin with what he himself believes and thinks
about various matters; rather, he begins with what Cordelia says and does, in order to gain
valuable insight in her world. Then he can use this insight against her, just as if it comes
from her and not him. In this way the seduction can happen without the victim noticing it.
To begin with what the other says and does is not in itself unethical because it is a way to
gain knowledge about the other. Johannes, however, abuses this knowledge when Cord-
elia’s own views on various matters become the threads he uses to spin her into his web.
Consequently he can, in contrast to the vulgar seducer, get his victim to believe that she
acts in accordance to her will, when in reality it is his will that controls her actions. For
example, Johannes gets Cordelia to break off their engagement. As a consequence of
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slyness and quick wits he gets her to believe that she does this according to her own free
will. In reality, however, her actions clash with her own will. Johannes seduces in such a
way that the victim gives him what he wants. With Johannes, his aim is to seduce in order
to attain physical pleasure. Rather than evil intent, Johannes seems to display narcissism
and a lack of empathy and compassion. It is here that seduction manifests its destructive
force.
If we transfer this example to a pedagogic context, we can begin to see some of the
problematic implications of using seduction. One is that a seducer always is in danger of
ruining the life of the seduced, even though the seducer may believe that s/he is living a lie.
The Norwegian dramatist Ibsen, who in many ways was greatly inspired by Kierkegaard,
said it in an appropriate manner in his play The wild duck (1884/1991, p. 192; my
translation): ‘‘Take the illusions from the average person, and you take happiness from him
at the same time.’’ Ibsen observed in his time that many people live in their illusions, or in
other words, they compose a world that they perhaps consider is better and safer than the
world they in reality live in (see Cappelørn 2010, p. 159). The seducer must therefore
address different questions, such as whether it is appropriate to try to seduce a person away
from their illusions, or not. Confronted with such situations, Kierkegaard chose not to
intervene for fear that he would take from the seduced Christians something that was,
despite everything, an important anchor in their lives (see Garff 2000). Furthermore, a
seduction can, in the worst scenario, lead to a complete delusion and perhaps even to
brainwashing as we see in the example from Strasser’s novel The wave (1981). Through a
mental and seductive game the history teacher in this novel brainwashes some of his
pupils, and this ends with him leading them to act like Nazis. We can say that seduction at
its most destructive is when the teacher manipulates the pupils into his own world (see
Kierkegaard 1846/1992, p. 74ff.). As soon as there isn’t space for other points of view than
the teacher’s, he is about to indoctrinate the pupils (see Spiecker and Straughan 1991),
while at the same time hindering the pupils from being free to choose for themselves.
On the other hand, the seducer must give the pupils a free choice, because the existential
education focuses on what Kierkegaard says in Works of love (1847), ‘‘to become himself,
free, independent’’ (Kierkegaard 1847/1995, p. 274). The individual can only become
himself, free, or, independent by taking the existential choice on his own, and then inscribe
the existential or subjective truth in his own life. The point is that the individual can not
live someone else’s truth about existence. From an educational perspective, the individual
can only become himself provided the teacher’s intervention is unnoticed. In Works of love
Kierkegaard explains how the existential education ought to happen by presenting two
sentences: 1. ‘‘This person is standing by himself through my help’’ (ibid., p. 274); 2. ‘‘This
person is standing by himself—through my help’’ (ibid., p. 275). The sentences are nearly
identical apart from one difference. The second sentence has a dash, which can perhaps
appear unimportant, but that little dash makes a significant difference when considering
existential education. Why might that be so?
The first sentence says that the pupil doesn’t really stand on his own legs. Instead of
standing on his own he is reliant on the teacher’s help—that really hasn’t helped the pupil.
The teacher has, according to Kierkegaard, only deceived the pupil, that is, deceived in a
vulgar manner. What I am trying to point out is that the teacher has been too direct in his
communication and thereby forced the pupil into an objective truth. But what if the
teacher, contrary to expectation, has managed to talk a pupil who was influenced by a
macho form of existence out of this? The pupil has apparently become free thanks to the
teacher’s direct help, but after all the help is only a deception. For Kierkegaard the pupil
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has not become himself in this manner. It can only happen when one makes the choice to
change to a new attitude to life by oneself. The teacher must therefore ‘know’ how a gift
should be given (see also Derrida 1996, pp. 74–77; Wimmer 2001, pp. 164–167). Above all
he must not approach in a manner that will make the pupil feel indebted to him.
The second sentence, on the other hand, says that the pupil really stands on his own legs.
This has to do with the teacher ‘knowing’ how a gift should be given, that is, he helps the
pupil who does not see the help. The help is hidden and must remain hidden or the pupil
will not gain independence. In other words, there must be seduction and deception, but not
of a vulgar sort. It is more about what Kierkegaard describes as ‘‘to deceive the other into
the truth’’ (ibid., p. 277). It is important to note that this does not concern some kind of
objective truth. The truth Kierkegaard talks about is not universal for all time and
everyone. Rather, it is a notion of subjective truth (see Walsh 2009, pp. 34–35). This means
that the teacher’s pedagogic assignment is not about bringing the pupil to his truth because
that would only be his own subjective and personal truth. All the same, the teacher must, in
a seductive and tactful manner, get the pupil to see his side of the situation. But the
teacher’s view, as stated, is neither general nor universal. He is even sceptical about his
own beliefs and opinions (Kierkegaard 1846/1992, p. 85).3 What it is really about is to
deceive or bring the individual pupil to the edge, as it were, but it is the singular indi-
vidual—hiin enkelte—who must cast himself ‘‘out on [sic] 70,000 fathoms of water’’
(Kierkegaard 1845/1988, p. 470). The pupil shall not be deceived into the teacher’s truth,
but into his own, subjective truth that must never be total (Kierkegaard 1846/1992, p. 85).
According to Kierkegaard, this teacher is doing everything for the pupil, but pretends he is
doing nothing. He takes no credit for what has happened; rather, it is a total self sacrifice,
about the same as working without pay (Kierkegaard 1847/1995, p. 276). Briefly it is about
giving ‘‘in such a way that the gift looks as if it was the recipient’s property’’ (ibid., p. 274).
In this way the teacher has managed to create an opening where the pupil is given the
opportunity to make the existential choice on his own. This can first happen provided the
teacher’s intervention is unnoticed.
Have we not here an example of an invisible form of coercion, or can we say that a
coercion that is done in secret is not coercion? I would actually say that a coercion that
goes unnoticed is a worse form of coercion than a coercion that is done openly. The
Kierkegaardian seduction thus has certain limitations. Nevertheless, I believe that it is
possible to solve this problem. To do this we must look closely at what the teacher hides. I
imagine that it is about holding back words and actions that demand recognition and
gratitude in return (see also Derrida 1996). This means that the teacher must act and speak
in such a way that the recipient does not feel that he should thank or praise the teacher for
the gift. In such cases, the gift is destroyed, because the one who offers the gift is in the
center of the event. The consequence of this is that the recipient is led into a kind of
existence that is controlled by the teacher. The former is not standing by himself but must
rely on the teacher as if the latter was a crutch.
3 This occurs in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments where Johannes Climacus
separates between direct and indirect communication. To communicate directly with reference to existential
issues is a deception, not only against God but also against oneself and another person (Kierkegaard 1846/
1992, p. 75). The reason is that the direct communication presupposes certainty and result, something the
existential never can be reduced to. Therefore, one must always communicate indirectly when it concerns
existential issues. Each person who communicates in this manner is, therefore, ‘‘never a teacher, but a
learner’’ (ibid., p. 85). This means that he always holds open the possibility to alter his view of life.
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The Teacher–Pupil Relationship as a Kind of Seduction
In Kierkegaard’s book Practice in Christianity (1850) we meet yet another seducer. This
seducer, as I shall argue, is more of an educational seducer, that is, he operates within the
boundaries of what is justifiable in a pedagogic situation. Yet it is a seduction and therefore
an example of a teacher–pupil relationship that is a form of seduction. I will first discuss
this in general terms and then focus in on the educational dimensions in order to answer the
question about the role and potential of seduction in existential education.
Anti-Climacus, who appears as the author of this book, provides his readers with a
thought experiment. His discussion focuses on a child because its mind is not yet cluttered
with too many prejudices. In other words, the child does not have to catch up with himself
because he is still at a ‘before-culture’ stage of existence. Anti-Climacus begins the process
of existential education by showing the child many different pictures. First he shows a
picture of Napoleon which is followed by a story about the French emperor. Next he shows
a picture of William Tell, also accompanied by a story. He continues to show other
pictures, when suddenly the child’s eye falls on a picture ‘‘that you have deliberately
placed among the others; it portrays one crucified’’ (Kierkegaard 1850/1991, pp. 174–175).
This is a prime example of seduction with a pedagogic purpose, as it is both intellectual
due to the teacher’s planning, and immediate due to the picture that seduces in a spon-
taneous manner. Why is this so? First of all because the picture was placed deliberately
with the other pictures so that it becomes possible to capture the child’s interest. Second,
the picture, which shows a representation of Jesus on the cross, has, as I see it, a far
stronger content than the other pictures which represent different heroic figures. This
strange and raw picture can therefore, I think, move the child to a much greater degree than
the romanticised hero pictures. Even if the teacher has seduced in this way, he has not
forced Christianity, or a specific ethical-religious form for existence, on the child. He has
been helping indirectly (Kierkegaard 1859/1998, p. 56), without the child noticing him. In
this way the teacher has avoided appearing as an authoritarian and didactic figure that urges
and instructs. Such a course of action, where the teacher is too visible and conspicuous in a
situation where there is talk of education that focuses on the pupils life choices, will easily
insult the pupils who consequently will not allow themselves to be captured and interested
(ibid., p. 54). By being visible and at the same time invisible, the teacher can awaken the
child’s curiosity. In this case we even see that the child asks on his own initiative. The
child wonders who the crucified is and what he has done, so the teacher is given an opening
to follow up with a story that must be told ‘‘very vividly’’ (Kierkegaard 1850/1991, p. 176),
that is, seductively.4
Here Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti Climacus is very concerned that the Christian way
of life, which we can consider as a specific form for existence, must not be forced upon
someone against their will. Yet, as I read Kierkegaard, the existential education has to
begin with a degree of planning. First, the teacher places, with knowledge and will, the
picture of the crucified between the pictures of Napoleon and other heroes. Second, the
teacher consciously chooses to place the romanticised hero pictures up against the raw and
brutal picture. After having told of the murder of Jesus, he could only hope that the sight of
Jesus on the cross would seduce and move so strongly that the child’s own will would force
4 Of course, the child can not be completely without knowledge, as it is necessary to obtain a certain
understanding with regard to the content of the education. As I perceive Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, the child
does not know the history of Christianity, so that prejudices will not stand in the way of his future choice in
relation to existence.
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him to want to convert himself. ‘‘You are not being compelled against your will, but
blessed are you if your will compels you in such a way that you must say: I cannot do
otherwise, for this sight moves me!’’ (ibid., p. 171).
Johannes of The seducer’s diary, on the other hand, manipulates, and nothing more.
This is because he undertakes a one-sided manoeuvre, that is, he seduces Cordelia until she
has fulfilled his will. He tricks her, in other words, to do what he will. Therefore, it is not
love. It is rather a narcissistic action because he seduces with the aim to experience the
most possible physical pleasure.
Some might say that Anti-Climacus and Johannes are quite similar, for is it not just as
narcissistic to seduce someone into Christianity as it is to seduce in order to experience
pleasure? There are no clear-cut answers to such questions, but I believe that it is possible
to trace an essential difference between these two figures, that is, a difference that is of
great importance with regard to existential education.
Anti Climacus seduces also, but, as I see it, he undertakes a double manoeuvre. To
begin with he leads the child towards a particular picture. Herein lies seduction and
deception. If he had stopped with this, if he had only deceived, he would have appeared as
Johannes, a deceiver and manipulator, and nothing else. By undertaking yet another
manoeuvre, though, he becomes something more. He emerges, I think, as a teacher who
takes his ethical responsibility. Right enough, he deceives the child but it is not about the
doing of the teacher’s will. Rather, the child is faced with a choice. The child must decide
if he will follow his earlier will or change it. The teacher has entered love, as Kierkegaard
(1850/1991) defines it, because he is open to the possibility that the child will continue to
live as before. This possibility must be there, or he will have become like Johannes—that
is, a pure manipulator who only can use, or better still, misuse his authority—rather than
giving it away. It is about giving the other person a choice, that is, one transfers authority to
the other, who has the right to choose to make the change or not. This tells us that the
teacher has really been in the sphere of love the whole time, also when he intervened. He
intervened in the child’s life, but he didn’t do it for gain, unlike Johannes. Rather, he did it
to serve and humble himself and at the same time lead the child’s attention towards
something new that he did not know before. He opened a new world that the child could
choose to live up to in his own subjective manner—or no.
Theoretical Reasons: Aesthetic Devices and Narration
This example where the seduction has occurred through aesthetic devices (more specifi-
cally: pictures) and narration, is only a thought experiment. But theoretic reasons can also
be given that offer a more elaborate answer about similar seductions and their role and
potential in and for existential education. Let me take the reasons one after the other. First I
will place the aesthetic devices within a theoretic framework, before I complete this section
by doing the same with narration.
Aesthetic Devices
It could be argued that aesthetic elements in teaching have a magical power to steer people
onto a path they may initially had not wished for or had not thought of taking (see also
Eisner 2004). By giving seductive devices a prominent place, for example in the form of
pictures, literature, music, aesthetic teaching speaks to a large degree to the sensual and the
emotional. The strength of such sensual and aesthetic devices is that they often affect the
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whole existence of people, and they can therefore extend peoples contact with their sur-
roundings, which indicates that the aesthetic devices speak to other aspects of people rather
than the logic and concept orientated aspects (see also Adorno 1996). We cannot simply
decide that we like an aesthetic expression or not: either its quality strikes us or it doesn’t,
and this may even happen independently of what we on a rational plane think about the
aesthetic expression. This does not exclude, of course, that any form of aesthetic experi-
ence is related to the beholder’s knowledge, prior experience, mood, and the like.
According to Adorno (1996) and others the aesthetic and seductive devices are context
dependent, as that which fascinates one person doesn’t necessarily have the same effect
upon another. Yet, the chances of a successful seduction are probably better the more one
knows a person. In other words, it is an advantage, in light of seduction, to have a certain
knowledge about that which really means something in a pupil’s life. Therefore, the
teacher should, in certain contexts, begin where the pupils are (Kierkegaard 1859/1998,
p. 46). However, we must not forget that little is more comical than adult people trying to
talk the same language as young people, for example by taking a starting point in popular
cultural references that, from the young people’s perspective, are totally passe´.
There is also, I believe, the strong possibility of catching the pupil’s attention if the
teacher, just as Anti-Climacus, provides the break in the pattern of the picture presentation
by, for example, introducing a picture where the content is very different from the other
pictures. Again, this is entirely dependent on the recipient, but as Kierkegaard says in one
of his journals, to relieve a formal treatment of aesthetic topics in a presentation with less
formal and lighter elements can have an educational effect (see Kjær 1986, p. 55). Such a
change in the presentation can be compared with, says Kierkegaard, the chorus in a song or
the comic parts in a romantic drama, where the effect can make a situation become more
concrete and ordinary (ibid.). In this way it may be possible to capture the pupils’ attention.
This is, of course, only an example of how seduction may function in practice. There are no
predetermined methods of how to seduce in the best possible way. I have only tried to
argue that aesthetic devices can be seductive in themselves, and that the seduction can be
further enhanced by presenting the aesthetic devices in certain ways. But that said, one can
never ignore the fact that any form of seduction is dependent on the receivers and the
context.
Narration
If the teacher would begin by using aesthetic elements this ought, in the light of Anti-
Climacus’s example, to be followed by lively and, as I will emphasise, seductive narratives
about these elements. A teacher who narrates and who fails to seduce will always have a
large handicap. The narration will probably not find its way to the pupils. Although we
should not underestimate the seductiveness of dry and direct narration (see Kierkegaard
1846/1992, pp. 516–517), the idea, from a Kierkegaardian perspective, is that the narration
must be so seductive that the receiver experiences himself as being a participant. This is
evident in Kierkegaard’s very first book, where he criticises the writings of Hans Christian
Andersen. Indirectly Kierkegaard says that Andersen, who is most known as a writer of
fairy tales, is a bad seducer because he, time and again, steps out of the narration to
comment and explain (Kierkegaard 1838/1997, pp. 24–25). Therefore, Andersen does not
manage to pull his reader into the narrative, thus positioning the reader as a spectator to the
event (ibid., p. 41, 51). Kierkegaard himself does not, in my view, lack the power of
narration. Of course, one can not just say that a particular author is seductive. There are
many factors that come into play, such as the reader’s experience, mood and so on.
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However, when Kierkegaard is at his best it is as if the readers are swept into the worlds of
other fictional people (see Billeskov Jansen 1951; Sløk 1993; Garff 2008a). It is as if we
are on the inside of a drama where we feel ourselves as being participants rather than
spectators. Kierkegaard’s own narratives are sometimes so seductive that they are capable
of sending the opponent into a drama that the he cannot control (Garff 2008a, p. 117). To
be even more precise: the seductive and the aesthetic narrative can send the subject in two
directions, out towards the narrative itself and down towards a passion that can be con-
nected to the narrative (ibid., p. 123). One can say that the narrative has swept the reader
into the drama that consequently has awakened the passion of the person. In this manner
the narrative has presented a choice where the receiver can choose to be oneself anew, or
not.
What Kind of Seduction Can Be Used in Existential Education?
So far I have discussed two examples. In the first I imagined a pupil who lived by certain
macho ideals from Hollywood movies, and a teacher who saw this as an illusion. In the
second I applied the thought experiment of Anti-Climacus in order to show existential
seduction in practice. There is considerable difference between the two examples. In the
first example the pupil is being led away from that which the teacher regards as an illusion
so that the pupil can catch up with himself, whilst the second example is about a child who
more or less is still ‘before’ the influence of culture. The seducer in the second example,
therefore, does not attempt to lead the child away from anything. The aim is rather to lead
the child into something, into a specific form for existence. Despite this difference there is
also a similarity between the two examples. In the first, the teacher assumes that the pupil
bases his life on a lie, which suggests that the teacher must have an opinion about
something that is true, or at least truer, with reference to existentialist issues. So too in the
other example, where the aim is to lead the child to a certain form of truth about being a
Christian person. Even if it is the child’s desire, and not the teacher’s will, that shall force
the child to take a new standpoint in relation to the ethical-religious form of existence, we
still cannot avoid the problem that marks both examples. The problem is that both
examples depict the teacher as one who has rather strong opinions about what is right and
wrong in relation to existentialist concerns. This is perhaps shown even more clearly in The
point of view for my work as an author: A direct communication, Report to history, where
Kierkegaard aims at communicating in a direct manner. Apparently Kierkegaard presents
himself in this text, or in parts of it, as a demystifier, that is, a kind of teacher who
presupposes that other people are deluded while he himself possesses the truth.
Discussing the Foucauldian idea of ‘counter-practice’ Biesta (1998, p. 507) emphasises
that ‘‘(a) counter-practice should not be designed out of an arrogance that it will be better
(or that one claims to know that it will be better; once again: ignorance) than what exists.’’
A teacher should, according to Biesta (1998), challenge his pupils, but he must not claim
that his views are better than theirs. With Kierkegaard it can appear so. This is evident for
example when he explains his deceiving strategy. According to Kierkegaard the teacher
must not communicate directly with a person who is only a conceited Christian. Hence, one
must not say: ‘‘I am Christian, you are not’’ (Kierkegaard 1859/1998, p. 54). To criticise
the other directly in this fashion will only give favourable conditions for negative feelings
that will hinder the opposition in rejecting his beliefs. The teacher must therefore speak
indirectly: ‘‘You are a Christian, I am not Christian’’ (ibid., p. 54). In this way the teacher
opens for the opposition to accept conversion to a new way of being a Christian. It can
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appear that Kierkegaard will demystify the other’s way of being a Christian. It is just as if
he says indirectly to the other person that he lives a Christian life in the wrong way, while
he himself is a Christian in the true way. And from here the other person can potentially be
led to the truth. ‘‘If you can do it, if you can very accurately find the place where the other
person is and begin there, then you can perhaps have the good fortune of leading him to the
place where you are.’’ (ibid., p. 46) This statement can easily be understood as that
Kierkegaard wishes to lure the other to a particular place which is defined beforehand—a
place, moreover, where Kierkegaard is already waiting.
According to Biesta (1998), who doesn’t speak about Kierkegaard, nobody has the right
to claim that his mode of thinking or living is better or truer than that of others. Such an
attitude is, of course, nothing less than arrogance. Nevertheless, some ways of thinking can
be categorised as conceited, but then we end up in questions about truth. Take for example
the pupil who maintains that the Holocaust did never happen. There is an infinite amount of
evidence that the genocide of the Jews and other groups has happened, and there is
altogether no ground to argue that it did not happen. The pupil who maintains that the
Holocaust has been invented lives in a fantasy world, beyond all reality. Yet when the issue
at stake is not truth but existence, then it is not so easy because existence is a matter of
what Kierkegaard calls ‘subjective truth,’ which means that the way one chooses to live
must be decided at the individual level. What can the teacher do in such cases? Biesta
(1998) suggests that the teacher should challenge the other, but without claiming that the
other’s way of living is untrue. Furthermore, the teacher can only show ‘‘that the way
things were was only one (limited) possibility’’ (Biesta 1998, p. 507). The teacher, in this
case, doesn’t communicate anything that suggests it is true, on the contrary, he commu-
nicates something that is different: ‘‘[a] counter-practice is only different’’ (ibid., p. 507).
In this manner the opposition is given the chance to see things in a new and different
perspective. The teacher, on his side, has avoided being reduced to a demystifier.
Concerning religious and existential issues, Kierkegaard suggests, in an extension to
Biesta’s argument, that the teacher must communicate indirectly, not only to avoid
appearing as an authority and domineering figure, but also to open the situation so that the
opponent can act with the intention of attaining his own subjective truth. This way
Kierkegaard avoids the problem of demystification. Take, for example, this quotation from
Practice in Christianity.
For example, it is indirect communication to place jest and earnestness together in
such a way that the composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be a nobody oneself.
If anyone wants to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will have
to untie the knot himself. (Kierkegaard 1850/1991, p. 133)
This means, as I see it, that the communicator is both present and absent. He is present
to intervene in another’s life, that is, he intervenes and challenges the other. Moreover, as
soon as the information has been communicated, he becomes ‘‘a nobody.’’ But this doesn’t
mean that he leaves the stage. As we saw in the example from the thought experiment of
Anti-Climacus, the teacher is there, together with the pupil. They share a commonality, but
as two different individuals. At the same time each individual must untie the knot alone. Of
course it is not possible to untie the knot only one way because it is dialectic, that is, the
information, in itself, is no jest and, in itself, not earnest, but both aspects. Jests and
earnestness—which are here used as examples—go dialectically into each other, so that the
information avoids clarity and conformity. The pupil’s destination is therefore not defined,
and in this way Kierkegaard avoids being a demystifier.
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Conclusions: Existential Seduction Without Coercion
Readers may well disagree with my attempt to make a case for the role of seduction in
existential educational. In my opinion, seduction is a rather unused and a little approved
educational resource—which is understandable given the potential dangers of seduction.
This is why we need to have certain knowledge about when seduction can be educative and
how it can be used safely. By way of conclusion I will offer five conditions under which
seduction can be used safely in existential education.5
Respecting Pupils
The most basic challenge a teacher must address with reference to existential education is
the question of what can be an appropriate way of life for another person. How shall the
teacher proceed when it involves such an existential concern? Should he try to seduce the
pupils out of what he thinks are delusions? Within the confines of existential education
considerations concerning the pupil’s subjectivity must have precedence over the aim to
adapt to culture and society. For example, the teacher must create the best possible con-
ditions so that the pupils can try out their choices without direct intervention. Rather than
becoming cultivated and socialised, the pupils must be given space for making their own
experiences so that this will give them the opportunity to find for themselves their path in
life. What seduction can effect in this context is awakening in the pupils the desire to ask
questions about their subjective truth. In this way seduction can happen without coercion,
or, to be more precise, the pupils are coerced to question their position in life, rather than
being coerced into a particular position in life.
Tact and Introspection
Seduction presupposes a high degree of pedagogical tact. If teachers go ahead without due
caution, without respect for the pupils’ vulnerability and with too much confidence in one’s
own capabilities, one risks to make serious mistakes. Every teacher who utilises seduction
must therefore continuously examine himself. A teacher with little introspection and too
much confidence can even risk being seduced by his own seduction ability, with a result
that is exceptionally unfortunate. Teachers must also be aware that the relationship
between the teacher and the pupil is and will be a power relationship, where one part is a
minor and therefore has a right to protection. Thus, it is also important that the teacher
must be aware of the destructiveness and strong powers of seduction.
The Value of Secrecy and Trust
Seduction presupposes that pupils must not know the ‘rules of the game,’ because if they
do the power of seduction will vanish. For the teacher this means that he has to be present
and at the same time not present. If the teacher is too present, there is the great danger that
the pupils will discover the seduction. In such circumstances everything can be ruined. The
secrecy of ‘the rules of the game’ must nevertheless never happen without trust. A teacher
who is not to be trusted can easily appear as a vulgar seducer who backs his words with a
5 The conditions that follow are suggestions based on the arguments I have presented in this essay. This is
why I have formulated them in an assertive way, almost as a manifesto which demands a critical appraisal
and a follow-up by ‘hiin enkelte’ reader.
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seductive smile, having an underlying agenda. The teacher must never forget that each
person is a unique creation with an absolute integrity that must be respected. One must
therefore never seduce from the position of personal interests, but always wish the best for
the pupils, being well aware that good intentions don’t always take something good with it.
Seduction Versus Indoctrination
The teacher ought to appear as an existential seducer instead of a teacher who indoctrinates
the pupils. That makes a huge difference with regard to existential education. Suppose the
teacher strived to get the upper hand by persuasion or to bring the pupils under control by
persuasion, just as TV commercials or advertising. He would indoctrinate the pupils.
Likewise, the teacher who wants to force the recipient to think in one way only, makes no
room for individual participation. The problem with this indoctrinating strategy is that the
recipient is being stripped of his right to choose on his own. Existential seduction, on the
other hand, has the advantage that it neglects the moralistic or didactic forms that result in
making the pupils servants to fixed ideas. Consequently, the existential seducer creates the
opportunity for the pupils to have a joint influence in their own lives.
Open for Choice
The teacher’s assignment does not consist of producing a singular and distinctive indi-
vidual. This nevertheless doesn’t deprive the teacher of the possibility to act. He can, for
example, create dramatic conflict narratives through which the pupils are, in a seductive
manner, drawn into the inside of new and foreign ways to relate to life. But the most
important point is that these narratives do not possess an objective truth which the pupils
will simply acquire. In all pedagogic situations where there is talk about existential themes,
the teacher’s communication must give an opening for choice, where either the receiver
rejects the whole communication or decides to choose a new path in life. This also means
that the communication has opened for a subjective truth, examples of which we can find in
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works. None of these works have an overall meaning and
none of them can be treated as authoritative systems. These books do not warrant an
allegorical reading and the reader should not search for an underlying meaning because
they are full of amphibolies—linguistic booby-traps—that can be understood in more than
one way. If, however, we are tempted to understand these works in a direct and
straightforward way—as if these works always shall have the last word—we end up
swallowing the bait. The pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard have no final conclusion,
and this must also be the case in a teaching situation where existential education is the
focus. The teacher can seduce the pupils to differing existential choices, but from then on
they must be given an absolute freedom to choose what they will do.
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